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Under a Vermont statutelS the Vermont Supreme Court held that plaintiff
could not inquire as to the juror's connection with a designated insurance company even though that company was conducting the defense. 1 6
In most of the jurisdictions the plaintiff's counsel cannot ask a juror as to his
possible connection with an insurance company for the sole purpose of informing
the jury that the defendant is insured. 17 Differences arise among the courts as to
the necessary elements to show that the counsel's questioning is in good faith.18
Bad faith is strongly indicated if a juror is questioned in regard to an insurance
company when defendant is not insured, or if the juror is questioned as to a
designated company when defendant is insured by a different company. The form
of the questions often shows the presence or lack of good faith on the part of
counsel.19
Policy dictates that an arbitrary line should not be drawn by the courts in
determining whether or not the questioning is permissible. This practice would
afford equal protection to the plaintiffs whether they are pursuing lines of questioning either in good or bad faith. A twilight zone exists at the meeting of the
extremes. It is at the discretion of the trial judge in the circumstances of each
case to limit the extent of the questioning. He should guard closely against improperly framed questions in an effort to determine whether or not the plaintiff's
counsel is acting in good faith. Plaintiff's counsel should, in good faith, exercise
caution in framing the questions so that the least possible inference is carried to
the jury concerning the insurance of the defendant.
DONALD N.

SHERARD

DETERMINING STATL' LAW UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF ERIE R.R. v. TOMPKINS
Plaintiff sought in a state court of South Carolina to recover as beneficiary

under a policy of insurance issued by defendant. On defendant's motion the case
was removed to a federal district court. The district court recognized that under
Errie RR. v. Tompkinsl South Carolina law should control the issues and that
according to such law ambiguities in a contract of this nature are to be construed

against the insurer. 2 Two months later plaintiff recovered on a similar insurance
contract from another company in the Court of Common Please for South Caro15. Laws of Vermont 1935, No. 47 states that a policyholder is not disqualified to sit as
a juror because the insurance company is an insurer of a party to the action.
16. Glass v. Bosworth, 113 Vt. 303, 34 A. (2d) 113 (1943).
17. Eldridge v. Clark & Henery Construction Company, 75 Cal. App. 516, 243 Pac. 43
(1925) ; Iverson v. McDonnell, 36 Wash. 73, 78 Pac. 202 (1904) ; Cameron v. Pacific
Lime Company, 73 Ore. 510, 144 Pac. 446 (1914) ; Mithen v. Jeffery, 259 Ill. 372, 102
N. E. 778 (1913).
1. Cases cited notes 6, 7, 8, 9, supra.
19. 56 A. L. R. 1462.
1. 304 U. S. 64, 58 Sup. Ct. 817, 82 L. Ed. 1188, 114 A. L. R. 1487 (1938), cert. denied,
305 U. S. 637 (1938), rehearing denied, 305 U. S. 673 (1938).
2. Plaintiff's husband, the insured, had made an emergency landing at sea. He was alive
and comparatively safe when an accompanying plane left two and one-half hours
after the accident. One hour later he was found dead by a rescue squad. The policy
of insurance exempted the insurer from liability for "death resulting from participation . . . in aviation." Plaintiff alleged that death did not result from aviation but
rather from exposure. This was the ambiguity to be construed.

NOTES
lina and no appeal was taken. Plaintiff then contended, when defendant appealed
the instant case, that the decision of the Common Pleas court in her other action
indicated the South Carolina law and was therefore controlling on the Federal
Court under the doctrine of Erie RR. v. Tompkins.3 The United States Court of
Appeals refused to recognize the Common Pleas decision and reversed on the
theory that the contract was not ambiguous. 4 On certiorari to the United States
Supreme Court held; affirmed for defendant, the Court reasoning that the Court
of Common Pleas in South Carolina does not have such importance within that
State's judicial system that decisions by it should be taken as authoritative expositions of that State's law. King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers, 33
U. S. 153, 68 Sup. Ct. 488, 92 L. Ed. 479 (1947),5 rehearing denied, 333 U. S.
878 (1947).
Erie RR. v. Tompkins,6 it will be remembered, went no further than to state
that the federal courts must follow state law as declared by its highest7 court. The
problem thus resolves itself to this: Just what did Mr. Justice Brandeis mean
when, in giving the Court's opinion in the Erie case, he said: "And whether the
law of the state shall be declared by its legislature in a statute or by its highest
court8 in a decision is not a matter of federal concern."? The natural interpretation would appear to limit the state decision to its topmost court, but further
statements by Mr. Justice Brandeis in his opinion indicate that the construction
might be otherwise. 9 It might mean the highest court to which a litigant may go
as a matter of right, or it might mean the highest court in which the particular
problem has been determined, or it might not mean the highest court at all.1O
In the ten years since the Erie decision the problem has subdivided into at
least four distinct considerations: (1) where the highest court in the state has
spoken on the precise point in issue; (2) where the highest court has given mere
dicta on the point in issue; (3) where only the lower courts have spoken; and
(4) where there are no state decisions at all.
The first classification appears to fit the Erie rule precisely and no federal
court has found difficulty in applying it.11
A more serious question arises when the only words from the state's highest
court are obviously dicta. Should such dicta be given greater weight than a
3. Note 1 supra. The Court said: "Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state."
4. Order of United Comm. Travelers of America v. King, 161 F. (2d) 108 (C. C. A.
4th 1947).
5. The Supreme Court added that it was not promulgating a general rule that federal
courts need never abide by determinations of state law by state trial courts and that
other situations might call for a different rule.
6. Note I supra.
7. Italics inserted.
8. Italics inserted.
9. Brandeis continues: "... and federal courts have no power to declare rules of common law applicable in a State .. ." It would appear that since federal courts have no
such power, it should not flow to them merely because the highest court of the state
has not spoken.
10. An extensive analysis of the problem may be found in Dye, Development of the
Doctrine of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 5 Mo. L. R. 193 (1940). The review is most
comprehensive but is limited inasmuch as it was written in 1940, before many of the
critical cases under the Erie decision arose.
11. Note 11 supra at 221.
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decision by an intermediate state court? Would it be better for the federal court
to guess whether the state's highest order will later resolve its dicta into a decision?
One of the first cases to construe the Erie doctrine, American National Insurance
Co. v. Belch,12 held that the court would follow the rule of the Supreme Court
of the United States when no Virginia Supreme Court ruling could be found in
point, the case having arisen in that state. On rehearing, it was found that the
Supreme Court of Virginia, in deciding a case on an allied point, had commented
favorably on the rule in New York which was different from the United States
Supreme Court rule. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
thereupon withdrew its opinion, holding that the Virginia law was the same as the
New York law on authority of the comment made by the Virginia Supreme
Court. Other cases have clearly suggested that in the event the highest court of
the state has never actually decided the point, dicta by that group will be preferred
to rulings of other jurisdictions on the same point.13
A further problem in determining what is state law comes when the only
decisions in point are those of the lower courts. In West v. American Telephone
and Telegraph,14 cited by the Supreme Court in its opinion on the instant case,
the Supreme Court held that an announcement of state law by an intermediate
appellate court must be accepted by federal courts in the absence of convincing
evidence that the law of the state is otherwise.15
In a case involving the effect to be given a trial court decision the District
Court for Southern New York stated that only the highest court of the state may
expound the law which must be followed under the rule of stare decisis in the
federal courts. 16 The court reasoned that since stare decisis does not bind the
higher courts to the opinions of the lower courts it should not bind the federal
courts in their conclusions. In Cooper v. American Airlines,17 however, the same
District Court for Southern New York held that the decisions of lower trial
courts must be regarded unless "there is persuasive data that the highest court
would 'decide otherwise." The United States Court of Appeals, although stating
the same rule, reversed on grounds that the lower courts had not decided the
precise issue, but instead the question was still open and undecided.18
The District Court for Nebraska, on the other hand, has given a rule that
clearly represents the liberal side of the proposition. In PrudentialIns. Co. v.
Zimmerer,19 that Court held that in the absence of a pronouncement by the State
Supreme Court, the federal court must follow such indices of applicable state law
as are available, including the opinions rendered by a court commissioner, even
12.
13.
14.
15.

16.
17.
18.
19.

100 F. (2d) 48 (C. C. A. 4th 1938).
Shanks v.Travelers' Insurance Co., 25 F. Supp. 740 (N. D. Okla. 1938).
311 U. S. 223, 61 Sup. Ct. 179, 85 L. Ed. 139 ,132 A. L. R. 956 (1940).
The Court also cited Six Companies of Calif. v. Joint Highway District 13 of Calif.,
311 U. S. 180, 61 Sup. Ct. 186, 85 L. Ed. 114 (1940), rehearing denied, 311 U. S. 730
(1940), where it was held that the United States Court of Appeals cannot decide
whether they believe a conclusion by the District Court of Calif. is incorrect. Unless
there is convincing evidence that the law of the state is otherwise, the opinion given
by the state court must be upheld as stating the law of that state.
Kehaya v. Axton, 32 F. Supp. 266 (S. D. N. Y. 1940).
S7 F. Supp. 329 (S. D. N. Y. 1944).
149 F. (2d) 355, 162 A. L. R. 318 (C. C. A. 2d 1945).
66 F. Supp. 492 (Nebr. 1946).

NOTES
though the Supreme Court of the State would not be bound by such opinions. 2 0
In the instant case the Supreme Court gave two reasons for rejecting the
decision of the trial court of South Carolina as asserting the law of that state.
First, said the Court, a federal court is but another state court in a suit where
jurisdiction is based on diversity of citizenship of the parties,2 1 and since other
state courts are not bound by what is said regarding the law in the trial court, that
same immunity should extend to the federal court acting as a state court. Second,
the difficulty of locating the decisions of lower courts not of record would put a
premium on the financial ability required to conduct a search of the judgment rolls
or for the maintenance of private records. Such arguments do not, of course, apply
to the decision of intermediate appellate courts.
A nice distinction allowed the Court in the Fidelity case22 to uphold a decision of a trial court as stating the law of the State of New Jersey. The case
arose in a court of equity, and in upholding the latter's appraisal of the New
Jersey law, the Supreme Court of the United States eliminated the more serious
arguments against upholding the trial court's decision by showing that the New
Jersey Chancery Court has a relatively high place in that State's judicial system.
The fourth division of the problem was considered in New York Life Ins.
v.
Jackson23 in which the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Co.
Circuit said: "Since it appears that the precise question presented has never been
presented to the Missouri courts, we have no choice but to consider the question
• . . exercising an independent judgment with respect to the issues presented."
Along this same line, the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
in reversing the Cooper case 24 concluded by stating that it was their belief that
the case was in that zone in which federal courts must guess what the highest
court would do. The "guessing" theory has been used by the First,2 5 Eighth26
and Ninth27 Circuits, often being expressed more diplomatically as "exercising an
independent judgment." 28
In the Prudential case,29 discussed above, the District Court for Nebraska
was unable to find any indices of local law and thereupon allowed a delay while
20. Accord, New York Life Ins. Co. v. Ruhlin, 25 F. Supp. 65 (W. D. Pa. 1938), aff'd.

106 F. (2d) 921 (C. C. A. 3d 1939), cert. denied, 309 U. S. 655 (1939) ; Buttson v.
Arnold, 4 F. R. D. 492 (E. D. Pa. 1945); Alameda County v. U. S., 124 F. (2d) 611

(C. C. A. 9th 1941).

21. It is interesting to note that Dye in his article, note 9 supra, cites an impressive array
of cases to the effect that the Erie rule has been extended to cases of equity, bankruptcy, admiralty, evidence, parol contracts, and conflicts of law.
22. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, 311 U. S. 169, 61 Sup. Ct. 176, 85 L. Ed. 109 (1940),
rehearing denied, 311 U. S. 730 (1940) ; 313 U. S. 550 (1941).
23. 98 F. (2d) 950 (C. C. A. 7th 1938), cert. denied, 305 U. S. 640 (1938).

24. Note 19 supra.
25. Malloy v. New York Life Ins. Co., 103 F. (2d) 439 (C. C. A. 1st 1939), cert. denied,
308 U. S. 572 (1939).
26. Mutual Benefit Health & Accident Ass'n. v. Bowman, 99 F. (2d) 856 (C. C. A. 8th
1938), cert. denied, 306 U. S. 637 (1938).
27. Hagan & Cushing Co. v. Washington Water Power Co., 99 F. (2d) 614 (C. C. A.

9th 1938).

28. For examples of how other courts reach their decisions when no state decisions are
in point see: Toomey v. Toomey, 98 F. (2d) 736 (C. C. A. 7th 1938) ; Yoder v. NuEnamel Corp., 117 F. (2d) 488 (C. C. A. 8th 1941); Traveler's Indemnity Co. v.
Plymouth Box Co., 99 F. (2d) 218 (C. C. A. 4th 1938).

29. Note 20 supra.
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a case then pending in a state district court on an allied point was decided. Other
courts have expressed a desire for the delaying procedure followed in the Nebraska
case. In reversing the previously discussed Cooper case, 30 the United States Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit, said: ". . we are tempted to direct the district
court to withhold decision until the New York Court of Appeals makes an authoritative pronouncement. But Meredith v. Winter Haven31 . . . instructs us to
yield to no such temptation."
In concluding, it might be well to note that it was the undesirable results of
the belief on the part of the federal courts that there existed a body of federal
common law wholly apart from the state law which led to the decision in the
Erie case. It is apparent that the boundaries of that decision are far from firmly
established. Federal Courts have accepted the new philosophy and apply it with
varying fidelity,32 especially in those areas where the local law has not been unequivocally declared. Intermediate state courts appear to command at least surface respect, and their decisions are generally accepted as propounding the law
unless there is convincing evidence that the state law is otherwise.33 The few
courts that have recognized the trial court as an authority on local law apparently
have done so as a last resort in their attempt to "guess" what the state's highest
court would do with the problem. The instant case affirms that no greater respect
need be given such decisions.
ROBERT J. MURPHY
JACK D. JONES

30. Note 19 supra.
31. 320 U. S. 228, 64 Sup. Ct. 7, 88 L. Ed. 9 (1943) held: "... the difficulties of ascertaining what the state courts may hereafter determine the state law to be do not in themselves afford a sufficient ground for a federal court to decline a case which is properly
brought to it for decision." Cf. City of Chicago v. Fieldcrest Dairies, 316 U. S. 168,
62 Sup. Ct. 986, 86 L. Ed. 1355 (1942) where the court held in an equity case that
"... it is a wise and permissible policy for the federal chancellor to stay his hand in
absence of an authoritative and controlling determination by the state tribunals. In
this case . . . discretion calls for a remission of the parties to the state courts which
alone can give a definite answer to the major questions posed." Cf. Thompson v.
Magnolia Petrol Co., 309 U. S. 478, 60 Sup. Ct. 628, 84 L. Ed. 876 (1940); R.R. Commission of Texas v. Pullman Co., 312 U. S. 496, 61 Sup. Ct. 643, 85 L. Ed. 971 (1941).
32. "In searching for the correct legal rule to be used in reaching our answer, we are not
here compelled by Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins . . . to play the role of ventriloquist's
dummy to the courts of some particular state; as we understand it, 'federal law,' not
'local law,' is applicable." Frank, J. in Commissioner v. Richardson, 126 F. (2d) 562,
140 A. L. R. 705 (C. C. A. 2d 1942).
It is our colleagues in the state judiciary ... who furnish-or gaily and maliciously
or indifferently refuse to furnish-the 'brute raw data' which we are required to
'process' . . . into the phenomenon of a 'federal decision' without making a single
change." Charles E. Clark, Circuit Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, in a lecture delivered December 4, 1945, before the New York
Bar Association. 55 Yale L. J. 267 at 269 (1946).
Further evidence of giving "lip service" to the Erie rule and then deciding as the
court thought best may be found in Paddleford v. Fidelity & Casualty Co., 100 F. (2d)
606 (C. C. A. 7th 1938), cert. denied 306 U. S. 664 (1938). The Court apparently
ignored a decision rendered by an Illinois Appellate Court which appeared directly

in point.

The court admitted the issues were within the Erie rule, but added: "...
since no
claim has been made that the local law is any different from the general law on the
subject, . . . and both parties have relied almost entirely on federal precedents." The

Court thereupon determined the issues without reference to the state law. Kellog Co.

v. National Biscuit Co., 305 U. S. 111, 59 Sup. Ct. 109, 83 L. Ed. 73 (1938), rehearing
denied, 305 U. S.674 (1938).
33. Fidelity Union Trust Co. v. Field, note 23 supra.

